China’s Threat and U.S. Domestic Politics
This project examines how external threats influence domestic politics, with a specific focus on the effect of threat posed by China on domestic polarization within the U.S.
The first paper, which has received an invitation to revise and resubmit at International Studies Quarterly, focuses specifically on the conditions under which Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. Congress collaborate to address the threat that China poses. Our research highlights that the collaboration between the two American political parties on China-related measures depends on the nature of the proposed legislation. Specifically, we identify two conditions that increase the likelihood of bipartisan support for China-related legislation. First, the legislation should not be related to U.S. domestic politics. Second, in cases where the legislation does intersect with U.S. domestic issue, neither political party should claim ownership of the issue it addresses.
The second paper, which is forthcoming at Political Science Research and Methods, investigates the influence of China’s threats on policy-based and affective polarization within the American public. We ask: Do China’s threats increase American bipartisanship? Our preregistered experiment shows that the threat primes—regardless of the partisan identity of their messenger—boosted both Democrats’ and Republicans’ support for assertive foreign policy, thereby failing to reduce preference polarization. Importantly, there were no measurable changes across multiple indicators of affective polarization. The most recent version is available here.
Military Alliances and Public Support for War
This project examines the influence of domestic public opinion on U.S. military alliance commitments.
The first paper, which is forthcoming at the Journal of Experimental Political Science, asks the following question: Does the public apply a “double standard” for human rights abuses based on the perpetrator’s alliance status? Research shows that individuals are more supportive of military action against states that violate human rights. However, other studies claim that condemnations of violations are often contingent upon the strategic relationship with the perpetrators. In this paper, we bridge these different strands of literature by examining whether the effect of foreign states’ human rights practices on public support for war depends on the alliance status of the violator. To investigate this interaction, we conducted two pre-registered experiments that independently randomized the state’s human rights practices and U.S. alliance status. Both experiments reveal that the alliance status of the human rights violator has a negligible effect on support for war. Consequently, our findings challenge the prevailing notion that the public applies a double standard for human rights violations. The most recent version is available here.
The second paper, which published at Research and Politics, investigates the extent to which the U.S. leader can mitigate the domestic costs of reneging on alliance agreements.We study strategies leaders use to mitigate these costs. Specifically, we experimentally investigate whether and how much the costs of reneging are affected by different sidestepping strategies and the costs of fulfilling an alliance commitment. Our U.S. experimental results show that the potential costs of fulfilling international commitments can dilute the domestic backlash for reneging on alliances, and that various sidestepping strategies that decrease backlash in the standard audience-cost context of reneging on a verbal threat are not effective when reneging on a formal alliance. The publisher's version is available here.
Deterrence or Provocation? The Effects of “Strategic Clarity” on Cross-Strait Tensions
The U.S. has long adhered to a policy of “strategic ambiguity” and refrained from explicit commitments to Taiwan’s defense. Recently, this policy has come under scrutiny with some analysts advocating for a “strategic clarity” policy, making it explicit that the U.S. will respond to any Chinese use of force against Taiwan. This paper asks two questions. First, does a policy of strategic clarity provoke or deter Chinese public support for aggression? Second, do Chinese and Americans have the same expectation regarding the effect of a strategic clarity policy? To address these questions, we conducted parallel survey experiments in the U.S. and mainland China, presenting identical survey instruments to citizens in both countries. Our experiments reveal two key findings. First, a strategic clarity policy provokes the Chinese public to endorse more aggressive policies towards Taiwan, rather than deterring them. Second, the U.S. and Chinese public view strategic clarity differently. Americans do not view it as provocative, but Chinese do. Our experimental results contribute to the growing literature on how senders and receivers interpret costly signals differently, thereby challenging a traditional assumption of the costly signaling model.
Pride and Prejudice: The Dual Effect of Wolf-Warrior Diplomacy on Domestic and International Audiences
China has shifted its foreign policy from careful diplomacy to “wolf warrior diplomacy” (WWD). This book project asks: What are the domestic and international consequences of China’s WWD? I argue that WWD constitutes a form of ingroup/outgroup discourse, encompassing pride rhetoric, humiliation rhetoric, and defamatory rhetoric. WWD increases the Chinese public’s support for their government. However, foreign audiences are likely to viewWWD as aggressive and threatening; as a result, WWD has dual effects, increased security for the regime at the domestic level and heightened tensions at the international level. I first employ machine learning models to analyze the usage of Chinese diplomatic discourses over the past two decades. The results of these models indicate a significant increase in the usage of wolf-warrior rhetoric, particularly since 2012 when President Xi Jinping assumed power.
To examine the dual effects of WWD, I conducted parallel experiments, in which I presented identical sets of survey vignettes to Chinese and American citizens. The results show that WWD significantly increases the Chinese public’s support for their government. However, this diplomatic rhetoric also antagonizes the U.S. public and bolsters their support for aggressive foreign policies toward China. These findings contribute to our understanding of the dual effects of authoritarian diplomacy in the global arena where national leaders face a trade-off between domestic stability and international instability.
A portion of this project has been published at Journal of Conflict Resolution. The most recent version is available here.